Abstract-In recent years. the notion of a service offering a degraded perforniance with respect to the best-effort service traditionally found in IP networks has gained acceptance among network researchers. Such a less-than-best-effort (LBE) service mtly he way of prol-iding a differentiated quality of service, following A. Odlyzko's "damaged for the Internet" approach. In this paper we are interested in evaluating, from a pricing perspective, the implications of the LBE may be regarded not only as a means of protecting "important" flows from congestion (due either to lessas a way to shift network usage towards off-peak times. Since LBB is designed to use idle network capacity, llows using LBE experience a better quality of service whenever the criticaltraffic load is low, M~~~~~~ it is intuitivelv ,-lex a,at LBE or to potentially .'damaging., Rows 
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B. Marking. schedriling and pricing
In this papcr. we are interested in studying the implications of the two scheduling models commonly used for building a LBE service-namely. PQ and GPS-from a pricing perspective (for an thorough overview of pricing issues in telecommunication networks. see e.g. [SI). In particular. we consider a for-protit network provider. and we focus on the provider's issue of maximizing her revenue. We wish to study. for each scheduler. how to optimally set prices and.
especially. the impact that a given queueing system may have on revenues. Our work is based on a recent paper by Mandjes [9] . where optimal prices and revenues for pU have been determined. Like Mandjes. we will use the performance of a single FIFO queue (corresponding to a network withorit service differentiation) as a benchmark.
In OUT model, a in [9]. we will assume that delay is the main QoS parameter users care about. Hence, a user's utility is described by a strictly decreasing function of delay; the impact of packet losses is left for further study. We will consider that there exist two classes of users (Or applications). which differ in their sensitivity to delay. Best-effort-and. more so, LBEcan he thought of as a service intended for transporting data flows without strong time constraints; nonetheless. for the sake of notational consistency with [!I], we will call "voice" risers those that prefer a lower packet delay. and "duta" iisers those having less stringent delay requirements. Both types of llows are assumed to be elastic [IO] , in the sense that they may Wade delay for price.
We assume that the network under consideration offers only two services: hest-effort and less-than-best-effortL. and that users are charged on a per-packet basis. The network is modelled as a single bottleneck node. where either a PQ server or a GPS server is used to handle two queues. one for packets marked as " B E and another for packets marked as " L B E . BE traffic is charged at a higher rate than LBE traffic. Like Mandjes. we suppose that there can be two marking scenarios: (1) a situation of rlrdicateii t r a . c classes. in which the network chooses to which queue packets must be sent. and The main contributions of this paper are 3s follows. First, we extend Mandjes' model of a PQ server to the case of a GPS server. To the best of our knowledge. there are no closed-form theoretical results concerning delay in GPS queues (for a discussion, see for instance [ I l l ) . However. one can argue that there is interest in offering some form of differentiated services (likc LBE) to elastic flows only if congestion may arise. Hence. for modelling purposes it makes sense to consider a network under the assumption of a /if!asytraf/ic reginie. as in [12] . In such a case. a two-queue GPS server behaves approximately like a "partitioned" server. that is. two independent FIFO queues. each with a service rate equal to the corresponding minimum guaranteed rate in the GPS system. This amounts to saying that, under the heavytraffic hypothesis. a GPS server with a different charging rate for euch queue can be regarded as a Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) network [13]-in which the capacity olthe link is logically split in two. Second. we compare the optimal revenues earned with PQ. FIFO and GPS scheduling. Our main conclusion is that a network offering two different services (i.e., BE and LBE) may yield higher revenues than a network with no service differentiation. and also that the type of scheduler used may play an important role in maximizing revenues. In particular. we show that: (a) Priority Queueing is more efficient. in economic terms. than both a GPS scheduler and a simple F'IFO queue: (hj revenues are lower with a GPS scheduler than with a FIFO queue.
C. Ourline of the paper
This paper is orpnized as follows. Section II present? a mathematical model of a DiffServ node supporting both BE and LBE service classes. using two different scheduling polities. Section 111 compares the performance of each scheduling policy in terms of the network provider's revenue. Section IV provides a discussion on the possible economic and practical implications of our main results. Finally. Section V concludes the paper.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Let us begin by a brief presentation of the model introduced in [9J by Mandjes'. Next. we will formalize the heavy-traffic assumption that we will use to treat a GPS scheduler as a set 'lhi nuin molivatition of OUT work was to study lhe cas< of Izss-than-hestiffon services: howwer. the mods1 presznlrd in this p a p mag of course be applisd also to a network offerin.. say. EF and AF services.
'In order to make OUT paper as self-conlaincd as possible. we provide in the Appciidir a summary of the main results of [SI. concerning the optimal piczs for b t h a FlFO and B PQ sewer.
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of independent FIFO queues. before stating our results on the optimal prices for the GPS queue that will be necessary for the revenue comparison.
A. llosic model
Consider an intinite population of potential users. Two types of Hows are considered. differing in their sensitivity to delay; we will call these traffic classes type-u ("voice") ami type-fl ("data") traffic.
The rifilih' users get depends not only on the mean packet delay E D . but also on the price per packet p , in the following way:
with 0 < a,! < CQ. so that type-<, flows have a higher preference for small delays. ad and a" may he regarded as the "delay-sensitivity parameter" for each traffic class. It is assumed that users enter the network whenever their utility is positive.
Throughout the paper, we are going to consider a M/M/1 queue with service rate p and with N independent users. each user generating packets according to a Poisson process with rate A. however. when a queue is empty. its idle server capacity is shared among the other classes (i.e., the server is workconserving). In a heavy-uaific scenario. it is assumed that. for all the classes. the probability to have an empty buffer is close to zero; in this situation. the GPS queue can he seen as I logically separate MIMI1 queues (with queue i having a service rate y;~, where 11 is the service rate of the "global" MIMI1 queueing system). If we consider that trailic in each queue is charged at a different rate. this logical split o f the server actually results in the Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) model [13] . whose performance has been investigated elsewhere 1151, Assuming independence between the M M l l queues. it is easy to show that the steady-state probability of having at least one empty queue is PO = 1 -nf=, pi.: with pi = X/(yi/b). An t-hrai?;-trufic regime is such that RI < e. for an arbitrarily small value of t. We will provide later an interpretation of this probability. when prices are set to their optimal values for the GPS queue.
1:rorn now on. let us hxus on h e 1 = 2 case. corresponding to two traffic classes. Let 0 5 -; 5 1 denote the proporlion of bandwidth allocated to queue i = '2; service rates are then
(1 -7 ) p and yp for queues 1 and 2. respectively. We will begin by looking at the optimal prices and revenues when a given type of uaffic is directed to a given queue (i.e., the dedicated classes scenario described in Section I-B). Afterwards. we will look at the case of open classes.
I ) Uerlicated classrs:
Assume that queue I is dedicated to type-c traffic (the most stringent one) and that queue 2 is devoted to type-d traffic. Therefore: ? x 100% and (1 -" j ) x 100% of the bandwidth is assigned to type-d and type-o traffic.
respectively. The number of type-cl users is Proof: From (9). we get that the second derivative of revenue ng& for a GPS queue unde; an e-heavy-uaftic regime are given by:
Therefore. is convex in -j. Moreover. we have:
The revenue function ng2s ( p l , 1a) as given by (7) is a continuous. derivable function on the domain DD. To tind its maximum. we first equaie the following partial derivatives to n: ., Hence. the probability of having at least an empty queue in the system is:
Note that. interestingly enouph. when prices are optimal the load of each queue (and so the probability 1% related to the heavy-traffic regime) depends only on the delay seilsitivities cl,. and ad.
2) Open classes: Let us suppose now that users are free to select to which queue packets are sent. irrespective of the traffic clas: this means that there rnighf he both typei! and type-d packets in the same queue. We will keep the same notation as in the dedicated-class scenario. In particular. 
c ) Do (only type-$ ti-ajjk):
This case is similar to ihe preceding one. except that only "data" packets are present.
Proposition 4: The optimal prices over DO are given by: 
GPS queue in an t-heavy-traffic scenario: optimization donuins for
can obtain the result of Proposition 4.
fi)r to be non-empty is:
Using the same kind of reasoning as for the previous case. 
Proposition 3:
The optimal prices over 1% are given hy:
Over AT^). die revenue function is:
In a similar fashion, we obtain the revenue function over A@'. which is: Note that ( p ; : p $ ) E KO. Proof: The proof follows along the same lines as the Finally, in order to find the optimal priccs. one simply has to compare the maximum revenue over thc three suh-domains DO and 11,Io. e ) Optitrial baii~lwidtli sharing: In order to find the optimal revenue for the open-classes case. it remains to find over which sub-domain this maximum is attained and for which value of 7 . However. for the sake of clarity we will postponc this analysis to Section 111-8 (we will find that. anyway. the best solution is to takc -1 = 0 or -1 = 1. which is equivalent to the single-queue. FIFO case).
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proof of Proposition 3.
COMPARISON OF OPTIMAL REVENUES
In this section. we will compare the maximum revenue that may be obtained with the two chosen server types. PQ and GPS. We will use the maximum revenue yielded by a single FIFO queue. given by Mandjes in [Y] . as a benchmark. First, we will study thc dedicated classes scenario. then the case of open classes.
A. Derlicated classes
In this case. type-tj packets are sent to queue 1. whereas type-rl packets are sent to queue 2. L.et Il; denote the optimal revenue for a F Q system with dedicated classes (Appendix 8.1). We have the following main result. n;ps = n;rFo 5 G .
In words. the maximum revenue in a Priority Queueing system is always higher or equal than that of a "partitioned" server (i.e.. a GPS server under heavy load). Moreover. a FIFO queue yields the same optimal revenue as a GPS server under heavy traffic.
The proof of this theorem is divided in two parts. First. we will show the relationship between Ihe optimal revenues for a GPS server and for a FIFO queue, then we will prove that the latter is less than or equal to the optimal revenue of a PQ server. Each result is given as a lemma.
Lemia 1: In a system with dedicated cl %PS = n;,Fo.
Proat We showed in Theorem 2 that the optimal revenue IIcPs for the GPS server is: ngPs = nrax(4(n,):A(adj), with ,4( : , ; ) = I L i ~t-I: ( L ,+,~ j" 1 i + ,~. which amounts to taking either -j = 0 or y = 1. That is, when the revenue is optimal the system becomes a single M/M/I queue served in FIFO fashion with service rate p. As shown in Appendix A. the above expression is exactly that of the optimal revenue for a FIFO queue. Hence. nbps = IIhF0.
In other words. revenue is optimal when there is a single u a i k type in the GPS system with dedicated classes but. as Mandjes [Y] proved. optimizing the revenue in a single FIFO queue also requires having a single traffic class (because, for a given price. flows from different classes do not mix).
Lenniia 2: In a system with dedicated classes. we have that: n;, 2 n;rFo-
Proof: Let us quote thc following argument from [Y].
A FIFO queue can be regarded as a special case of a PQ system-indeed.
it suffices to take p 1
in which case only one queue is "active". Hence. the PQ system cannot yield lower revenues than the FIFO queue.
B. Oprn classes
In this .scenario. users are able to select to which queue packets are sent. Let us recall the form ofthe revenue function that we wish to maximize:
with A, and I\! denoting the arrival rate and the number of users, respectively. for queue i . Let n;, denote the optimal revenue for a PQ system with open clnsses (Appendix B.?).
We then have the following main result. . That is. the maximum revenue in a Priority Queueing system is always higher or equal than that of a "partitioned" server (i.e.. a GPS server under heavy load). Moreover. a FIFO queue also yields higher or equal revenues than a GPS server.
To prove this theorem. we will proceed as in the dedicatedses case; two intermediate lemmas will allow us to show the main theorem. Lewwo 3: In a system with open classes. we have that:
In words. the highest revenue that we can get with a GPS server corresponds to that of a single FIFO queue. (161, we readily obtain the optimal revenue for a tixed y:
I&,(?.)
Ibis function is convex in y. and its maximum is at one 3f the edges of the interval given by (13):
since we are assuming that I/, is nun-empty, i.e. Suppose now that p ; = I and pi = 1. We obtain that ihe revenue for a fixed y is
which is independent of y. However. for a FIFO queue with 11 = 1 we have a revenue p -1. Therefore. we also have that 5 n&,.
Suppose now that TJ? = but pz = 1. The optimal revenue for a fixed 7 IS now: is similar to the previous one.
We follow a similar approach to deal with the sub-domains DO and MO. Fnr instance, regarding Do (i.e.. only "data" traffic is present). it is easy to check that the previous results apply by simply changing aU by a d , with the optimal prices given by Proposition 4. By similar convexity arguments_ we also get that IIEPs 5 IIhFo.
Since taking *{ = O or y = 1 in the GPS case is equivalent to having a single FTFO queue. we deduce that II& = n&,.
Let us now state the second lemma. concerning the revenues G~~ 5 n;.
Pi-ooj? As described in Appendix B.2. we decompose the optimization domain of no in three sub-domains V . D and ill (see Fig. 2 ).
Assume that p > 1 (otherwise V and M would be empty). which also leads tn n&, 5 n;. w
IV. DlSCLlSSION
The rcsults of Mandjes [Y] imply that it is interesting. from an economic point of view. to offer some kind of service differentiation; in fact. a shown in 191 . Concerning the utility function. it may be interesting to take packet losses into account.
We would like to extend our results~to a whole network.
and investigate the associated routing problems.
. 
B. PL) schefliilinp
The main results of where p~ and p2 are the per-packet price for priority class 1 (the highest priority) and 2 (the lowest priority). respectively. 
